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Abstract
Populism has become a defining feature of European and world politics. During the last 
decade, major drastic changes in the political landscape have occurred, with France appearing 
as a singular example: none of the two candidates who made it to the second round of the pres-
idential elections were from the traditionally dominant center-left and center-right parties. 
This paper analyzes the presence of populism in the political narratives by the main political 
contenders in the French presidential elections held in 2017. It does so through a discourse 
analysis of some of their most widely seen political speeches around the campaign, providing 
an overview of the different framing techniques used by each candidate and their degree and 
type of populism.
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Resumen
El populismo se ha convertido en un rasgo definitorio de la política europea y mundial. Durante 
la última década, el escenario político ha sufrido cambios drásticos, donde Francia sirve de ejemplo 
singular: ninguno de los dos candidatos de la segunda ronda de las elecciones presidenciales 
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provenía de los tradicionales partidos de centroizquierda y centroderecha. Este artículo analiza 
la presencia de populismo en los discursos políticos de los principales candidatos en las elec-
ciones presidenciales francesas de 2017. Para ello, se analizan algunos de los discursos de la 
campaña con más repercusión, mostrando una visión general de las diferentes técnicas de 
encuadre usadas por cada candidato y su grado y tipo de populismo. 
Palabras clave: populismo, análisis del discurso, Francia, elecciones, encuadre.
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of populism has gained ground in the political sphere over the years, 
often described as a discourse “technique” used by political leaders and parties alike to 
gather support from different social stratum. From Trump in the United States and 
Bolsonaro in Brazil, to current governments or relevant parties across the EU, 
populism is an ever-present element of their approach to politics. However, this idea 
is also often used as a proxy for demagogy or as a political insult (Müller, 2016), 
grouping different political options and thus blurring the picture, instead of clarifying 
the analysis. And it is also generally used to describe political opponents (Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, 2008). The French presidential elections were no exception to this, 
with two outsiders reaching the second round of the elections, with Macron’s pro-Eu-
ropean victory seen in the rest of the continent as a relief, in what felt as a near-miss 
for one of the core EU countries, which could have come under the rule of the far-right 
National Front. Populism had been a defining factor during the electoral process 
(Lazhortes, 2017; Ivaldi, 2018).
This article focuses on the rise of populist presidential contenders and the presence 
of populist discourses and strategies in certain political leaders’ speeches during the 
2017 presidential election, given its special significance for the French political life 
(Kubicek, 2017). In addition, the article classifies the candidates in terms of the popu-
list items and ideological frames that are attached to their positions. Therefore, the 
main question we seek to answer is twofold: first, which candidates are using populism 
and to what degree; and second, what is the dominant kind of populism. The analysis 
is based on the narratives employed in the political speeches delivered by the party 
leaders during the presidential run. 
For this purpose, the article is structured as follows: section two addresses the 
theoretical background including an extensive literature review on the topic, together 
with the definition of frames used for the classification of populism. The methodology 
and case selection are explained next; followed by the discourse analysis itself in the 
fourth section. The discussion of the results and the conclusions are presented in 
the fifth section, where we answer the research questions.
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Populism
Populism, from the Latin word populus (people), has been analyzed for decades in 
its current form, but in modern political analysis, it appears in the United States with 
the Populist Party and the so-called Narodniki in Russia in the nineteenth century, 
both agrarian-based movements (Mudde y Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Academic 
research has departed from a plurality of perspectives to understand the contemporary 
use of the word —see, for instance, Havlík and Pinková (2012); Weyland (2017); 
Ostiguy (2017) and Mudde (2017). Some of them understand it either as a commu-
nication approach, a particular hierarchical structure, or a thin-centered ideology. 
However, in the first case the normative dimension of populism is missing, and in the 
second this structure might not be present (Pauwels, 2014). The third proposal, 
the ideational one (Mudde, 2017) is used in this paper, and it approaches populism as 
a thin-centered ideology: one where only certain items of the cosmology are present, 
but that requires one or more additional ideological points of view to complete the 
puzzle and offer a coherent vision, such as nationalism or socialism (Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Pauwels, 2011, 2014), in which the context of the political 
arena is framed in a certain manner by populist politicians (Hawkins et al., 2019). 
To analyze the populist dimension in the parties, this paper draws from the Idea-
tional Approach used by Hawkins et al. (2019), taking onboard the 4-item scheme 
used by Pawels (2011) from Mudde (2004, 2017) comprehending both communica-
tion and reality-shaping (normative) traits for populism: the existence of two homog-
enous units (people and elite), the antagonism between the two, the centrality of the 
general will or pure sovereignty of the people, and the characterization of the people 
(the “common man”) as inherently good and the elite as inherently bad, a scheme 
widely used in academic literature (Stanley, 2008; Mudde, 2007; Muddle and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2013; Pauwels 2011; Hawkins et al., 2019; Kriesi y Pappas 2015). This 
provides a clear-cut set of items to operationalize, finding which parties use populism 
and to what degree, as more practical breakdown of Laclau’s (2005) classical defini-
tion of populism. In this sense, it is important to consider that “the political discourse 
is by definition demagogic” (Charaudeau, 2005) and, thus, a certain degree of 
populism is to be expected in any political discourse. 
Populism in France
There is extensive literature analyzing the phenomenon of populism in France 
from a variety of points of view —see, for instance, Dieckhoff (2018). A significant 
part of authors analyze the demand side (the voters) and are generally focused on the 
position of the National Front (Mayer, 2005; Mazzoleni et al., 2003; Fieschi, 2004; 
Albertazzi y McDonnell, 2008), paired with the recurring topic of the change in the 
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composition of the electorate (Oesch, 2008). Examples of more contemporary anal-
yses include the work of Ivaldi et al. (2017) and Birnbaum (2017) on the European 
scale; and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) and Kriesi and Pappas (2015) from 
a comparative perspective in which France is one of the cases. Specifically focused 
on the French elections of 2017 is the analysis of Ivaldi (2018) and Birnbaum 
(2017). These studies, in general, either depart from or conclude that the National 
Front (currently Rassamblement Nationale) is a far-right populist party, and some 
include Mélenchon’sparty, La France Insoumise, as a far-left or social populist party 
as well. However, these studies assume the populist nature of these two parties from 
the start, therefore leaving a research gap as to which can be truly considered and why.
Classification of populism 
Populism revolves around the idea of people. However, the construction of the 
“people” within the discourse can adopt several forms, depending on who is included 
and who is excluded (and who is the elite against whom the people is defined). This 
can be seen in Reungoat (2010), Mudde (2007) and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2013), and is also included in the idea of “people” as an empty significant (Laclau, 
1977). There are, in France, two cleavages upon which populism builds around: the 
social cleavage (including both the vertical division of social classes and the hori-
zontal dimension of territorial division) and the collective identity one, where issues 
such as national identity or globalization can be found (Dieckhoff, 2018). How these 
cleavages are framed in the political discourse leads to a classification of the kind of 
ideology attached to populism (Hawkins et al., 2019): concerning the construction 
of “people”, the academic literature has often pointed to a distinction between inclu-
sive and exclusive populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; McKean, 2016). 
This broadly refers to either a social or an ethnic idea of the people: in the case of 
inclusive populism, everyone who does not belong to the elite is part of people. In 
the case of exclusive populism, certain subgroups are excluded from the main group, 
namely immigrants. 
Framing, according to Entman (1993), “can be defined as a process in which some 
aspects of reality are selected, and given greater emphasis or importance, so that the 
problem is defined, its causes are diagnosed, moral judgments are suggested and 
appropriate solutions and actions are proposed” (cited in Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015: 424). 
As Hawkins et al. (2019) explain, populist leaders frame the political context and turn 
it into a populist landscape, by activating and making salient latent populist attitudes 
in the public. For this purpose, the political arena and the larger context is reshaped 
with the mobilization of in and out-group identities, the dispositional attribution of 
blame, and the heavy use of emotional triggers. Political leaders, use these frames or 
narrative in their political discourse, supplying an interpretation of reality that helps 
us understand in what way he or she interacts with the electorate and what elements 
make up his or her political message. 
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Methodology and case selection
In order to identify the four relevant items of populism according to the idea-
tional perspective, as well as inclusive/exclusive items, the leaders’ speeches are 
studied using discourse analysis. While some of the dimensions of populism 
(particularly the references to the people and the elite) can be traced using more 
quantitative methods —see, for instance, Pauwels (2011) for content analysis—, 
the centrality of the general will, and, in particular, the moral distinction of the 
dichotomy is more complex to grasp. In particular, because mention to certain 
issues is often veiled and indirect (Wodak, 2015) and also because these items can 
be framed by many other resources than mere word repetition. Candidates are 
analyzed case by case in their speeches, exploring their main narratives, cleavages, 
and presence of the items of populism and inclusive or exclusive traits. For a clearer 
analytical view, in the final chapter a table displays the different items in a compar-
ative fashion.
Discourse analysis
Discourse here is contemplated as data that can be analyzed, that is, text in 
context, part of the process and action, and wider than text (Titscher et al., 2000). 
Political discourse can be considered as part of the political process and as a form 
of political action: discourse has performative power over reality (van Dijk, 1997); 
it is both a frame in Goffman and Lakoff’s terms. The phenomenon of populism is 
assumed in this paper from an entirely discursive reality, as the root of the populist 
concept (Mudde 2004; Laclau 1977). Therefore, the actual analysis of what political 
speeches say, identified as political discourse (van Dijk, 1997), is the most reason-
able approach to carry out the discursive exercise per se, as can also be seen in the 
work of Wodak (2015) for the case of Populist Radical Right Parties.
In discourse analysis, the four defining items of populism have been traced, 
together with inclusive/exclusive traits, as well as the framing of reality within the 
discourse, to properly characterize the framing of the political context these leaders 
use, beyond their stated ideology. In this case, discourse analysis allows not only to 
find which topics are relevant —which can be obtained with other methods of content 
analysis (see, for instance, Rooduijn (2009)— but also how they are treated or 
discussed politically. This is a fundamental aspect to understand the ideological back-
ground of these parties and to detect the confrontational narrative that singles out 
populism. The analysis below displays, case by case, the particular approach to each 
item of the ideational approach, alongside the inclusive/exclusive traits and an over-
view of the general narrative structure. In particular, mentions of the people and elite 
as separate (and opposite) interests is analyzed, paying special attention to the 
dichotomic nature of the distinction, as well as of the presence of the moral consider-
ation. The centrality of the general will and pure sovereignty is also mapped in the role 
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the people must play, as well as the presence or absence of “dangerous others” in the 
speeches, of cultural threats (such as Islam) or human groups (such as migrants). 
Case selection
This paper focuses around the presidential run of 2017 and it analyzes political 
speeches by party leaders during this period. The choice of selecting public speeches 
over written works is solely based on the nature of the material: written speech is 
fertile in rhetoric figures and use of language, and it provides an insight into how 
political parties and speakers frame political life and society (Wodak, 2015). These 
materials are widely used in academic research for this purpose, including similar 
theoretical background for countries such as Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium 
(Pauwels, 2011), and France for different purposes, such as the work of Sini (2016) 
and Birnbaum (2017)
Eleven candidates obtained the necessary 500 or more signatures from elected 
officials to announce their candidacy. For reasons of relevance, the candidates 
analyzed are limited to five among those eleven: Marine Le Pen, Emmanuel 
Macron, François Fillon, Benoît Hamon, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon. They were 
the only ones present in each debate, were consistently viewed as the “most 
convincing candidates” in all polls (Europe1, 2017; ELABE, 2017; Micheau, 
2017; Levy et al., 2017; IFOP-Fiducial, 2017), the leading candidates in all polls 
Table 1.
Materials used for analysis
Candidate Political Party Speech Date




Emmanuel Macron La République en Marche
Paris 19/01/2017
Porte de Versailles 10/12/2016
Pavillon Gabriel 02/03/2017




François Fillon Les Républicaines
La Villette 29/01/2017
Paris 01/03/2017
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(Ipsos, 2017), and were the five most voted candidates during the first round of 
the elections by a large margin. In particular, the choice of the respective group of 
speeches has followed an extensive revision of the electoral campaign, to find 
examples which are long enough to allow for a valid analysis while allowing the 
comparison, as they occurred during similar moments of the campaign or are 
directly related it. Given access problems to material from Front National’s leader, 
Marine Le Pen, we have analyzed, together with a speech from the electoral 
campaign, two speeches delivered by her after the presidential elections but 
directly related to them. The speeches have been selected regarding both their rele-
vance —since all of them were central acts of the political campaign, with big 
audiences and widely watched online— and their availability for analysis. 
ANALYSIS
The excerpts of speeches shown below include the source between brackets, which 
can be found in French in the Appendix, together with their online source addresses.
Marine Le Pen. Front National
National Front or Front National (from now on, FN), renamed Rassemblement 
national or National Rally in June 2018, has become a leading political force in French 
politics, gathering much of the nationalist and conservative votes, and whose candi-
date, Marine Le Pen, successfully reached the second round of the 2017 presidential 
elections. 
In terms of narratives, the most distinctive feature of FN is the explicit acknowl-
edgment of the divide that lies at the very heart of the movement and serves as the 
basis of their political strategy: the nationalist/globalist dichotomy. As Ms. Le Pen 
stated in one of her speeches, referring to her own candidacy and that of Emmanuel 
Macron’s, who appears as FN’s ideological rival: “These two lists are the two poles of 
the second round of the presidential election; these are the two ideological alternatives 
offered by the new national / globalist divide that has imposed itself in French polit-
ical life” (Kintzheim).
Later she adds, in relation to the would-be “natural rival” of FN, the center-right 
Les Républicaines, a political force that held presidential office on various occasions, 
“the truth is that the national / globalist divide is going through the LR party and is 
fracturing it” (Kintzheim).
FN’s nationalistic approach to politics is not new. However, while setting the 
political stage around this cleavage, Ms. Le Pen aligns her party with other politicians 
or political parties that question, from the nationalist-populist trench, the current 
state of globalization, such as Donald Trump. Through this, she also defines a discur-
sive framework that combines other identity-based cleavages FN has resorted to in the 
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past, establishing a kind of continuity between the old nationalistic and populist 
approach of the former FN leadership and the anti-globalization, nostalgic stance of 
Marine Le Pen. “The people”, according to Le Pen, is thus inseparable from the histor-
ically and culturally built ‘the nation’, bearer of all virtues: “To rule is, on the contrary, 
to know there is a story behind people; there are affections, there are preferences, there 
are passions, there is pride” (Kintzheim).
And linked to it: “[…] Behind the fight of the nation, you know it my friends, 
there is one way of life, an art of life, values; there is our conception of humankind and 
the world, there is a high vision […]” (Lyon).
This nation needs to find its way, and is directly under threat: “Our fight is that of 
the nation, of a nation that is at the moment at the meeting point between its glorious 
past and a promising future, as long as we know how to give it a soul, a vision, a direc-
tion. Our fight is that of the nation, a nation that took fifteen centuries to build but 
which can disappear in a few decades” (Lyon).
Le Pen positions herself as the next in a great line of leaders of the French people, 
while appealing to a “pure” yet indeterminate form of popular sovereignty: “On 
August 8, 1943, General de Gaulle reminded him in Casablanca: ‘The greatness of a 
people comes only from its people’. It is this principle which, during the 1500 years 
of its history, has shaped the France we love. It is this principle that I will implement. 
The gathering of the French people to which everyone aspires can be done only 
through the love of France” [Hénin-Beaumont].
This nation undergoes a massive struggle and risks disappearing, against an elite 
that could be called the “globalist” elite: mainly, the European Union, as we see below, 
depicted as the embodiment of nations’ woes, against which Le Pen clearly exempli-
fies: “[…] our business, I have told you, it’s France, and only France” (Lyon).
The elite is far away from citizens, and here she introduces the main local-global 
struggle, “that’s why we are also the party of proximity, of the local against the global” 
(Kitzheim). This dichotomy serves to put the concept of France (the idea of France as 
a nation or as a living society) against the European Union. This, too, lies at the core 
of the French far-right movement. 
France, as a member of the European Union, is shown as been subjected to an 
imposed foreign logic, which takes the shape, in a nationalistic way, of affronts against 
the very nature of France. For instance, the European Union, claims the FN’s leader, 
has imposed France a territorial model that has fundamentally condemned the country 
and its territories. As Le Pen herself states: “Our dear Alsace, like our beloved Lorraine, 
is right in not wanting to be drawn into the absurd logic of uprooted regions that the 
European Union has imposed on a vassalized France, a territorial model […] that 
comes from elsewhere and which does not correspond to anything at home. The 
government does not ignore the malaise created here by this institutional aberration” 
(Kintzheim).
It starts from detached politicians, unknown by the people, and finishes focusing 
on the European Union:
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Who knows the president of the community who drained [qui a vampirisé] the 
powers of your mayor, reduced to the role of mere administrator of civil affairs? 
Nobody. Who knows the European commissioners who decide for 500 million Euro-
peans what we eat, and soon perhaps what time we eat and even how we will eat? 
Nobody. At all levels, there is a power without a face and without a name, a totali-
tarian power intertwined in everything. I say it, the European Union, as it is conceived, 
is a totalitarian power that rules, orders, regulates (Kitzheim).
Here, Le Pen opposes an idea of France based on the principles of proximity, 
locality and citizenship, as well as a preconceived notion of a French-self, to the distant 
—yet apparently overwhelming— power of the European institutions and elites. She 
further emphasizes the local-global narrative by reiterating her party’s commitment to 
local institutions, which are part of French past, and by discrediting unknown insti-
tutions and politicians (namely from the EU) who want to impose a foreign model 
over France, effectively ruling the country from afar: 
We are proud of who we are, what our parents left us and what we will pass on to 
our children. This is why we are also the party of proximity, of the local against the 
global. This principle of proximity is valid […] also for our institutions. We refuse to 
let ourselves be imposed a system where we produce ten thousand kilometers away 
from home and recycle 4.000 kilometers away. In the same way we refuse distant insti-
tutions from leaders that no one knows: now, the institutional evolution tends to 
distance power from the citizens (Kintzheim).
The nationalist-globalist divide takes the form of the contradiction between France 
and the EU or between France and the world. And in all cases, France is portrayed as 
a country whose sovereignty is questioned or that has fallen under foreign rule. The 
European Union is seen, then as a totalitarian regime, the incarnation of the globalist 
elite, depicted in the worst possible terms. The second item, the antagonist relation-
ship between the two units, also appears in most speeches; as it is exemplified in this 
one, where the “peoples” of Europe are opposed to the European Union:
The EU is an organization without foundations, a space open to all migrations, a 
construction that has a universal vocation and does not take offense to see adherence of 
Asian countries, such as Turkey, or tomorrow Maghreb, like Morocco. Europe is the 
diversity of nations. The EU is levelling the peoples and cultures that make up Europe; 
it’s their planned disappearance. Europe is a living and joyous reality. The EU is an arti-
ficial ideological creation, cold and hopeless. Europe is the values inherited from our 
Hellenic-Roman civilization and our Judeo-Christian culture. The EU is a trading area 
where money and the values of globalization of the market rule (Kintzheim).
In this fragment, the nations of Europe, the people, is once again depicted in a 
positive light against the elite, as a historical and cultural reality and as a community 
threatened by a globalist organization (the European Union) ruled by economic 
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interests, where migration is considered a part of a deliberate attempt to level all 
peoples and wipe out their culture. This antagonism is also reinforced by the 
constant use of language “us” (the people, the nation) against “them” (the EU, the 
globalists), for instance:
The European Union is not made by the people, but by the banks; it is not because 
one wears a grey suit and a tie that one acts with good intentions. The European 
Union does not defend our interests they are not builders, but speculators. Mr. 
Macron, a former banker, is comfortable in this world. He even proposes to save a 
Europeanist boat that has waterways on all sides from sinking (Kitzheim).
Last, the unmediated leadership and pure sovereignty of the people against the 
elites is seen in several forms, particularly during her last speeches of the election run, 
such as: “[…] it is time to free the French people from arrogant elites who want to 
dictate its conduct. Because yes, I am the candidate of the people. I appeal to all 
sincere patriots, wherever they come from, regardless of their background, regardless 
of their origins, and their vote in the first round, to join me” [Hénin-Beaumont].
All four items of a populist discourse are found throughout her speeches, with a 
clear moral distinction between people and elite in all references to them, and lead 
eventually to a fundamental question posed to the nation, born from this funda-
mental antagonism that already exists, in the midst of the presidential elections and 
the immigration and national security debates:
The French must seize this historic opportunity that rises. Because the big ques-
tion in this election is a fierce globalization that endangers our civilization. The French 
have a very simple choice: we either continue on the path of total deregulation, without 
borders, and without protection, and therefore with relocations, unfair international 
competition, mass immigration, free movement of terrorists. This reign is that of 
money [roi argent]; Or we either choose France, with borders that protect our jobs, 
our purchasing power, our security, our national identity. You have the choice for 
change. The real one (Hénin-Beaumont).
Emmanuel Macron. La République en Marche!
Macron’s discourse is not based on the division between people and elite. It is 
rather a general proposal of collaboration among a diversity of people, beyond the 
common ‘honest working man’ simplification: “The renewal: these elections will allow 
the emergence of committed and talented personalities, elected locally, engaged, asso-
ciated, retired people, students, civil servants, employees, entrepreneurs, liberal profes-
sions, farmers and self-employed. Diversity will be taken into account” (Paris).
And while he does suggest addressing the French without differentiation: “But no 
matter where we come from, because we know where we want to go together. The 
fight we want to lead, which is important for us. What we want is not to bring together 
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the left, it is not to bring together the right, it is to bring together the French! This is 
our project!” (Versailles).
He also acknowledges plurality, not only within the people as listed above, but 
also in levels of government, contradicting ideas of “pure sovereignty” and reinforcing 
the need for institutions that characterize liberal representative systems: “The Republic 
must be plural. We need the departments, these city-centers, we need these munici-
palities, public services […]” (Versailles).
Instead of focusing on clear, dichotomic and moral divisions between us and them 
(people and elite), Emmanuel Macron proposes a political approach based on chal-
lenges. Like FN, Macron depicts France as a country that struggles in many fields, yet 
he shuns the divisions that, in FN’s view, have rendered France in that situation. In 
this regard, Macron, confident in France’s apparent exceptionalism, lists a series of 
issues that must be tackled in order to modernize the country: “[…] in a large country 
of the European Union which, for thirty-five years, has failed to solve the problem of 
mass unemployment. We are the only major European country in this situation. And 
at the same time, we are faced with new challenges: the digital revolution, the ecolog-
ical and environmental transition, the terrorist threat, which are nowadays changing 
our daily life” (Pavillon Gabriel).
These transformations, as Macron himself states, are not the neoliberal British 
reforms of the eighties, but instead a contract with French citizens through which 
bring about radical change. Such an agreement would consist mainly on six chantiers 
or projects: education and culture, work society, economic modernization, security, 
democratic reform and the international agenda. 
Throughout his explanation, Macron refers to them as challenge and insists on 
carrying them out with responsibility. The idea of a neatly defined political or social 
contract is a key feature in Macron’s discourse. He proposes the voter new faces in 
politics and tries to distance himself and his movement from traditional parties. There 
is also a commitment to eliminating the many conflicts of interest that have tarnished 
the French political life: “First —this is what we announced during the last days and 
weeks— a real strategy of moralization of public life. […]. The project of moralization 
of public life that we will carry is, first of all, to eradicate the conflicts of interests 
which today, sometimes, too often, exist” (Pavillon Gabriel).
Political renovation is the main driver in Macron’ narrative, rather than nation-
alism or the ideological divide. This standpoint depicts a centrist, liberal approach to 
politics, where practicality is considered a political guideline. This is also seen with 
respect to the European Union. Macron sees the European Union not as a separate 
entity, but as part of the French national project and an essential component of his 
own political platform, En Marche! The European agenda is thus considered the 
cornerstone of Macron’s proposals: without Europe, there can be no political renova-
tion or any response to France’s challenges: “Finally, it is obvious that Europe is at the 
heart of our project. As I said, many of the reforms that we propose in this project, and 
which I wish to carry out, are indispensable for France, but are expected at European 
level. We will not succeed in the world as it is today without a real European strategy 
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[…] to reconstitute the solidarity now lost within this area on the economic and social 
level” (Pavillon Gabriel).
And he devotes a large part of the discourses to this vision of Europe: “Europe is 
our best protection; it is our best shield in globalization. Europe is also our identity, 
what shapes us, our common dream” (Versailles).
Although centered on France, Macron provides a narrative more focused on 
solving political problems than defining a clear, identity-based political stance. The 
four items are clearly absent, with a narrative that is opposite to the dichotomic view 
of populism. Instead, an inclusive and encompassing vision of challenges to be solved 
collectively provides a rather different frame of the political context. 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon — La France Insoumise
Mélenchon builds his discourses around political elements inherent to the polit-
ical tradition of the Left. In general terms, Mélenchon’s speeches show a clear divide, 
one in which France and a combination of social movements stand together against 
economic and political elites, both national and European. He states, in this sense, 
that the Nation (which is used as a synonym with the people), the State and social 
rights —the backbone of the idea of France he wants to convey— are being attacked 
by neoliberal European policies and by the wealthy, especially the financial elite: “It’s 
not our people, it’s these programs. Here is […] the universe under the leadership of 
finances and its relay in Europe, that is the European Commission. It is necessary to 
leave this treaty because it is them who impose this to you” (Lille).
Like Le Pen, Mélenchon finds in the European Union, and leaders like Angela 
Merkel, a liability for the future of France instead of an opportunity for national 
change (as opposed to Macron). This critique of the European Union is often followed 
or accompanied by a defense of France’s “militant” tradition, one shaped by left-
leaning social struggles and resistance movements, both foreign and domestic. More-
over, this narrative usually emphasizes France’s rebellious past, the source of many 
social conquests: “Every people have their way of being and an accumulated collective 
culture. We, the French, built a State, this State was our strength in time [...]. It is 
around the State that we built our main collective victories, and which will make 
things better when leaving [sic], because things were in order. [...] It’s a chance for us 
to have the State secured for a long time” (Lille).
Mélenchon frames his speeches in the France-EU dichotomy, much like Le Pen, 
yet its content differs greatly from that of the nationalist political leader. Mélenchon 
uses the idea of France not as a form nationalistic affirmation opposed to the Euro-
pean project, but as a representation of the many political traditions that make up the 
French and international Left movements’ heritage. In this opposition, he builds 
the French people, akin to the nation, described as inherently good, in a clear messianic 
style of a “new dawn”: “We are the beautiful and generous France that begins each day 
under its motto: freedom, equality, fraternity! My beautiful country, my beautiful 
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homeland. And you, everyone, we can be proud of what we have undertaken and 
achieved. We are a conscious and enthusiastic force. [...] All of you, beloved home-
land, you are a brand-new morning that is beginning to break” (Paris).
One of the key elements he points out in his speeches is the capitalist system, 
understood in a broad sense. Although he never actually defines capitalism in an 
analytical manner, he describes the changes it has gone through over the las few 
decades, especially in Europe. Mélenchon states that capitalism has developed in a 
way that is more prone to crises and leading to deeper social inequalities. Due to this, 
he criticizes the economic elite, who he claims demand greater sacrifices from the 
people: “These are the extremists of the market. The situation, they tell us, will recover 
if we save money. As we have been told for thirty years, there is a crisis and we must 
save money. [...] These people tell the people around them: we spend too much [...] 
France lives beyond its means” (Lille).
The political sphere, in Mélenchon’s worldview, has been influenced by the 
changes in the economy. The transition to neoliberalism has subjected public institu-
tions to private entrepreneurial interests. It also common to see Mélenchon describe 
the European Union as a tool that implements socially regressive policies. Further-
more, Mélenchon’s proposal of establishing the Sixth French Republic is shown as a 
form of breaking away from the capitalist power structure in France, calling for direct 
and “real” democracy: “The time has come for a government of ecological responsi-
bility towards humanity, a government of social responsibility, a government of 
democratic responsibility, which gives the people the right to reconstitute itself 
through new institutions […] it’s the Sixth Republic and her right to permanently 
control those who appointed her” (Toulouse).
He is addressing the people, the working France that wakes up every morning, 
linked to republican values, as he conceives them. This characterization of the people 
is reinforced through the speech, as can be seen below, when the opposition with the 
elites is drawn. The elite is outlined in a clear negative light, linked to the capitalist 
system commented above, complementing the antagonistic existence of the two units 
with their moral distinction: “Of course, by then, mediacrats and oligarchs are jubi-
lant. Nothing is so beautiful for them as a second round between two candidates who 
approve and want to extend, both, the current institutions” (Paris).
And is fundamentally opposed to the interests of the people, as the benefits one 
group obtains are detrimental to the other: “If you have none of this, it’s because there 
are others who take advantage of it for you. Because these shameless people prefer to 
pay themselves dividends instead of investing, proof that they are stupid” (Toulouse).
Including the interaction with the public for this antagonism, where the elite is 
depicted as the “masters of the Earth”: “Where is the people’s freedom, who did not 
want this austere European treaty and into which you forced them? The important 
ones, the powerful ones, the masters of the earth, you have reasons to be nervous, 
listen to them!” (Toulouse).
Mélenchon directly questions the elite after the public screams dégagez, dégagez (go 
away). Nevertheless, during all these parts of his discourse, he does not use a classical 
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separation in social classes (despite some assimilation of working class and the poor), 
rather using in its place the populist empty signifier. Pure sovereignty of the people can be 
seen in extracts like this one, where an argument for direct democracy is made: “See how 
freedom, starting from the individual, is transformed into a program that protects it, then 
spreads into a system of institutions and political relations and crowns itself in the nation. 
There is no doubt about what is proposed. The program does not hide it: I am a separa-
tist. I propose the sovereignty of the people to be fully restored in all areas” (Toulouse).
However, there are no particular traces of the unmediated leadership indicating a 
common trend in the left where monolithic or personalistic leadership is not particu-
larly approved (or made explicit). 
François Fillon. Les Républicaines
The conservative candidate’s discourse is fundamentally based on the idea of 
France and on French identity and values. It starts off from a common premise, often 
seen in other candidates: the apparent frailty of the country. Fillon develops a narra-
tive in which the French people, considering the moral and social challenges the 
country faces, should commit to serving the country and thrive in such endeavor 
without expecting anything in return. As the candidate explains: “France does not ask 
anything from us. We owe her everything. To serve her, we will need courage, will and 
friendship, and none of this is missing. The challenges are immense. What do we see 
around us? […] A country without a leader” (La Villette).
Facing the country, he positions himself as the personal leader of the French 
people, committing himself entirely to the cause: “To you, I swear to give all that a 
patriot can give to his country. I will give you everything: my determination, my 
courage, my will to win” (La Villette).
A further link is stressed during his March speech, when the first voices appear 
calling for him to be brought to justice, as he uses this duty and need to serve France 
as the reason to continue the political campaign: “France is greater than us. Greater 
than my mistakes. Greater than the biases of a large part of the press. Greater than the 
excitement of opinion itself. And it is because I am totally determined to serve France 
that I will oppose, with all my strength, that chance or calculation decide its fate and 
the future of the French amidst a decisive consultation” (Paris).
These people are described as a single entity, one with the leader, akin again to the 
nation. He describes the people as bearer of virtues and linked again to him, as he comes 
directly from it: “I am a candidate for the presidential election for France. I am not a 
marketing product, my word is not whispered by the microcosm, […] I want to embody 
the pride of a nation that cannot be defeated. I speak to all French people. There are no 
right-wing against left-wing people. There is only one people” (La Villette).
And in another fragment, he delves deeper into the “honest working man” idea of 
the people, always connected to him: “I like France and the French. I came across 
faces [...]. I did not forget anything. I have not forgotten the courageous words of this 
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farmer who works 70 hours a week for 800 euros per month. I remember the testi-
mony of this French officer, on a mission in the Sahel, who told me how his company 
had rebuilt a destroyed school in a village” (La Villette).
From the digital revolution to climate change and Trump’s presidency in the 
United States, France is portrayed as a country that must withstand a period of uncer-
tainty in order to remain a strong, sovereign nation in an ever-changing world, with 
constant remarks to the centrality of the general will: “Our only room for maneuver 
lies in our ability to come together, to work more, to work together, to seize all the 
scientific and technological potentialities of which the French spirit is capable. Our 
room for maneuver is in our inflexible desire to be sovereign, listened to and respected 
around the world” (La Villette).
Fillon, in light of this, describes a series of reforms that aim to modernize France 
and, as he claims: “Free the activity of all sectors which have been blocked by fiscal and 
regulatory bludgeoning” (La Villette).
More specifically, his proposals are mainly centered around the economy, job 
conditions and public administration, areas that, according to Fillon, are governed by 
rigid, bureaucratic institutions.
In his speech, the elites are not necessarily opposed to the people, but as part of the 
same people and are expected to cooperate in this road to reform, whether rich and 
poor, workers and company-owners: “But I also know that we will need everyone, 
that I will have to serve everyone, and believe me, I am ready. I reject these unneces-
sary divisions that many of my competitors draw. Let us not oppose the rich to the 
poor, the entrepreneurs to the workers, the believers to the agnostics, those who have 
chosen France and those who have inherited it” (La Villette).
Meanwhile, the European Union is illustrated rather ambiguously, as an entity to 
be reformed and shaped according to France: “Europe must be for France an amplifier 
of sovereignty. I do not speak of technocratic Europe with its Byzantine norms. I am 
talking about the Europe of nations, [...] I want ‘Europe but with France at the front’, 
as Philippe Séguin said” (La Villette).
One final component of Fillon’s narrative is France’s identity, which in part 
becomes a projection of France in the world. Fillon sets out to reinforce national 
unity, because he understands France as a unitary entity with a single culture, as 
opposed to a mere sum of parts. This inner unity involves in this case assimilation for 
immigrants: “I name things. I name the problem we have with radical Islam [...]. I 
want to reduce immigration to a bare minimum, by organizing it by quotas, according 
to our economic needs and our integration capacities. Immigration without integra-
tion, without assimilation, must be stopped. In the French Republic, foreigners have 
duties before claiming all rights” (La Villette).
Adding to this, and in line with the general climate against the political class, he 
points out the “old politics”, a sort of elite, a political caste that lives out of the effort 
of the hardworking Frenchmen and women. 
While Fillon does not define an essentially dichotomic political and social sphere 
between the people and the elite as such, he does characterize every other political 
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option as part of the same group, by calling them (from LFI to the FN) different 
shapes of the political left: “The first left-wing, the pure and hard left, red as the reds, 
we all know it. It’s Mélenchon, the Fidel Castro of YouTube. [...] The left n° 2, we 
also know it, it is the socialist left, [...]. The left n° 3, we know him less. It is Macron. 
He says he has a project; I’m waiting for him to show it! [...] And then there is the left 
n° 4 [...]. It’s the National Front. It is the program of the Communist Party of the 70s 
or of the Popular Front!” (La Villette).
This type of classification has a clear anti-establishment message (Pauwels, 2011), 
displaying the logic of the political campaign where differentiation is needed, but also 
a “populist displacement” of the discourse (Mudde, 2004). Fillon, despite the elec-
toral campaign, displays a populistic message, where he, as leader from and of the 
people (which includes what others might call elites) fights against the political class 
and the immigrants who challenge the essence of France. While not as populistic as Le 
Pen, he clearly (with more strength on some points than others) adopted a populistic 
approach to the elections.
Benoît Hamon. Parti Socialiste
The Parti Socialiste presidential candidate, Benoît Hamon, develops a discourse 
around three fundamental elements: French national identity, republicanism and the 
French socialist tradition. In Hamon’s case, French history is the discursive thread that ties 
together the candidate’s narrative, allowing him to create a frame where republican values 
are inseparable from democratic socialism. Particularly, socialism is shown as the contin-
uation of the French republican tradition. This is clear when he states that the political 
Left will make a difference in the election, ultimately winning the political bout, as it is a 
force of progress that has been determinant in shaping modern France: 
So we wanted this day to reflect the change we bring: fraternal, happy […]. I came 
to tell you that the left can win, that it must win. Because what is at stake here is not 
the destiny of a single man. The left is the breath that comes from afar, from the heart 
of the struggles that shaped ourselves as French people, as Republicans, as socialists. I 
present myself before you accompanied by a long procession of struggles, ideals, 
heroes. I present myself before you with our dead and their message of life [Bercy].
The Left, as mentioned, is conceived in Hamon’s speech as a key component of 
France’s political history. Yet it is also a political identity of its own. He does not 
necessarily construct a single unit of “people” throughout the discourse, as it is mostly 
directed towards the “political leftists”. This can be seen in some excerpts where he 
proposes the need to return to the ground in a struggle for direct democracy against 
the right-wing: “We, the left, have given too much ground to the ‘declinists’, to the 
reactionaries, to the partisans of withdrawal and rejection. We did not know who we 
were anymore” [Bercy].
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This way, Hamon defines the Left both as a political force and as a collective iden-
tity. These two ideas coexist throughout his speech and by combining them, the candi-
date tries to evoke a sense of pride and belonging to a greater political project. 
As mentioned, the idea of the Left is shown as a general narrative or frame with 
significant political meaning, as it is linked with democratic values and to the repub-
lican institutions of France, as well as to the Nation’s history. However, this tradi-
tional approach to the political left combines with the more encompassing concept of 
“citizens”, who should overtake the political elite and replace it, fighting in the process 
for direct democracy, and highlighting the centrality of the general will and pure 
sovereignty of the people, another common feature of social populism: “To the citi-
zens, the Republic will say: ‘act’! You, citizens, are often more loyal to the spirit of the 
Republic than to your leaders, so become your own leaders, because that is the spirit 
of ‘democracy with all its consequences’ that we want. […] Citizens, today you have 
the political class you deserve, so replace it, take power!” (Bercy).
In the lines above, however, he suggests a rather unusual idea when compared to 
other leaders and political speeches in general (“citizens, today you have the political 
class you deserve”), making the people co-responsible for the situation instead of 
being passive agents under the sway of an extractive elite. 
Additionally, Hamon’s republican Left allows him to define the Republic-enter-
prise divide, whereby he confronts this idea to that of a country controlled as if it were 
a private company. Concerning this, he criticizes the austerity policies implemented 
by both the French government and the European Union, which he deems favorable 
to corporate interests. Hamon outlines an elite composed largely of multinational 
companies, the rich, and traditional political parties, in a clear negative manner: “If I 
carry the torch of the left, it is to relight the flame of the Republic. I first want to say 
it solemnly: the party of money has too many candidates in this election. […] Money 
has its grip on this election. It tells us, as Guizot did under the Restoration: ‘enrich 
yourself!’. The others think: ‘enrich us!’” (Bercy).
In this political landscape, the economic elite have their own candidates to the 
presidency, but they are all essentially the same people. Hamon then continues with a 
negative depiction, as he defines this elite in an antagonistic role vis-à-vis the people: 
You know them, these well-informed people, noble, especially among themselves 
[…]. These sophists who explain to us that the answer to the social crisis is a little less 
Labour Code, the response to the ecological crisis is a little more nuclear, the response 
to the democratic crisis a little more cult of the providential man. […] These people 
who sneer when we talk about a European budget treaty or a contribution to the 
added value of robots, and who are embarrassed when these ideas are supported by a 
world-renowned economist, Thomas Piketty, and a successful global entrepreneur, 
Bill Gates (Bercy).
Within this dichotomy, the States collides with “money” and the question rises as 
to each one’s political allegiances, stating clearly that the two groups have conflicting, 
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incompatible interests: “No one can serve two masters, the Republic and money. The 
people and money. France and money. […] I think only of the greatness of our 
country. They think only of power; I think only of my duty. They are the candidates 
to achieve their own destiny or secure their future. I will be President to prepare our 
future” (Bercy).
While a staunch defender of the republican system, Hamon acknowledges the 
Left’s historical commitment to reform. He, like Mélenchon, stands for the establish-
ment of the Sixth French Republic, which should, in light of his description, serve as 
an example to the world: “Today I remembered we have an objective, from which 
nothing and no one will turn us away: a benevolent Republic, the first powerful 
social-ecological Republic, whose message will be heard again” (Bercy).
The new Republic that Hamon sketches gathers many a common principle of 
modern-day progressive movements; it is a system that would stand for justice, ecology 
and fraternity. This is a corollary to Hamon’s proposals, as his platforms is founded on 
combating fatalism within the left political spectrum. In this sense, he explicitly rejects 
the idea of unmediated leadership, supporting instead a cooperative proposal for this 
endeavor: “I said it and I confirm it, I do not believe in the providential man. I do not 
pretend to hold the truth, I leave it to philosophers and people of faith. I always prefer 
the ‘we’ to the ‘I’” (Paris).
Hamon uses to some degree all four items of discursive populism, but the defini-
tion of people is ambiguous, at times encompassing the whole of French population 
(citizens) and at times referring to the political left, while acknowledging different 
classes and groups instead continuously addressing the people. More importantly, he 
addresses the people as co-responsible of the current situation, rather than just blaming 
the elites, which nonetheless are depicted as a collusion of rich companies and an 
established political class. This becomes a crucial opposition in his narrative, taking 
Hamon closer to the grounds of social populism. However, the position of the leader 
as the sole mediator is only partially used, as in some occasions he refers to notions of 
collective leadership, while nevertheless the centrality of the general will is consistently 
dominant. Notably, he does not include the European Union as part of the elite, just 
some of their austerity policies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Table 2 in next page summarizes the findings of the analysis in a comparative way. 
These findings are discussed in detail below.
Using the degree of populism as a defining trait, the speeches display interesting 
variations through the traditional left-right divide. Mélenchon and Le Pen are, in 
theory, at opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. However, and leaving immigra-
tion aside, their discourses mirror each other beyond the high degree of populist narra-
tive displayed by both candidates. Fillon and Hamon occupy intermediate positions, 
appearing a softer version of the previously mentioned candidates. The outsider, in 
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terms of the content of his discourse, is clearly Macron: the narrative built throughout 
his speeches barely displays any trait of populism, despite the heavy use of rhetorical 
figures. This is also seen from the ideational standpoint of how the context is framed: 
the use of cognitive tools such as blame attribution, emotional triggers and in- and 
out- group identity mobilization is clearly dominant in both Mélenchon and Le Pen. 
Nevertheless, a major difference arises here: the limits of what constitutes the people 
are much broader in Mélenchon’s inclusive populism, while Le Pen clearly defines 
“dangerous others” that are excluded from the people-elite dichotomy. 
Marine Le Pen’s discourse combines an exclusive form of populism —one that 
confronts the people with the elite— with a nationalistic, radical republican, “right to 
be different” narrative. In her discursive approach to politics, Le Pen brings up key 
issues such as national sovereignty and immigration, which serve as the groundwork 
of her own political campaign. Mélenchon mirrors Le Pen’s discourse in populistic 
terms and shares similar considerations as to the collusion of the globalist elite and the 
European Union and the exceptionality of the French nation. However, he considers 
immigration as a positive aspect and does not include the “dangerous others”. In addi-
tion, he pays attention to the capitalist economic system, as he considers it a source of 
social inequalities and democratic deficits. Le Pen and Mélenchon constitute the most 
populistic candidates, and they respectively represent two clear forms of populism: 
namely, exclusive national-populism and inclusive social-populism. In spite of this, 
and as mentioned above, their narratives have many common elements; and their 
discourses are framed on similar terms, excluding the perspective on immigration.
Fillon, who relates a liberal-conservative speech, also creates a certain discursive 
division in which hard-working French people are crippled against a crooked political 
class (which includes every and each one of the other parties), while at the same time 
demand collaboration to the elites. The strongest populist item in his speech is the 
unmediated leadership; most probably following the Gaullist tradition. Interestingly 
enough, he also devotes a large part of the speech to immigration, Islam and the threat 
to French identity, portraying the European Union ambiguously as something to be 
reformed in order for it to serve French interests. As for Hamon, despite being from the 
same party of the then incumbent president François Hollande, he uses some degree of 
populism. However, populist elements are much less present than in Melenchon’s or 
Fillon’s speeches. Instead, he has other striking parts, such as the call for the People’s 
responsibility. Being a moderate version of Le Pen, Mélenchon and Fillon, Hamon 
fulfils the items to be a national-populist and exclusive leader, but they are not as domi-
nant as in Le Pen’s case. Hamon could thus be described as somewhat social-populistic, 
but like Fillon, the confrontational narrative is not the defining issue of his speeches.
Emmanuel Macron, as stated above, stands as the clear outsider of the populist 
zeitgeist of the elections. He builds his narrative around the different challenges that 
France faces, and while he addresses a political class and expects his grass-root move-
ment to surpass it, he also expects the elites to cooperate with the people; and the 
European Union is seen as a positive actor and a key aspect of the discourse. The 
discourse, focusing on the mentioned challenges and around traditional liberal issues, 
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does not intend to create a dichotomic, contentious political space, but a mostly inclu-
sive and in-group mobilization and the use of emotional triggers (which are otherwise 
common in campaign) as main populist framing markers.
In all candidates but Macron, populism is a common feature and present at a 
high level, including the two candidates from the traditionally dominant center-left 
and center-right. It is not clear if this might be due to the need of distancing them-
selves from Hollande government (in the case of Hamon), because there has been a 
general “populist displacement” of public discourse, or both. While Mudde (2004) 
argues that populism is contagious, a research by Rooduijn et al. (2014) points out 
the opposite, particularly in the case of France. Equally noticeable is Macron’s 
success, whose narrative differs fundamentally from the rest of leader’s, by being by 
far the least populistic candidate. This contrasts with claims in the media of Macron 
being a representative of some sort of “mainstream populism” (see Muller, 2018). 
As the research quoted here focused on electoral speeches, it would be interesting 
to test if there has been indeed a populist contagion of other parties in the last elec-
tions, how far back this trend can be found in parties that traditionally were not 
considered populist, and what other factors contributed to these high levels of confron-
tational, populistic organization of political narrative across the French political 
spectrum. 
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